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According to phenomenological and enactive approaches, human sociality does not start from isolated 
individuals, but from intercorporeality and interaffectivity. To elaborate this concept, the paper 
introduces (1) a concept of embodied affectivity, regarding emotions as a circular interaction of the 
embodied subject and the situation with its affective affordances. (2) This leads to a concept of embodied 
interaffectivity as a process of coordinated interaction, bodily resonance, and ‘mutual incorporation’ 
which provides the basis for a primary empathy. (3) Finally, developmental accounts point out that these 
empathic capacities are also based on an intercorporeal memory that is acquired in early childhood.
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Since the rise of cognitive psychology in the early 1970s, ‘social cognition’ has become the   
dominant concept in social psychology and cognitive neuroscience to denote the processes 
of social understanding and empathy. It is commonly based on a representationalist point 
of view: Internal cognitive mechanisms such as a ‘theory of mind’ enable an observer 
to ‘mentalise’ or ‘mind-read’, i.e. to infer others’ hidden states of mind. Regardless of 
whether these mechanisms are described as akin to a scientific ‘theory’ or rather as a 
mental ‘simulation’ routine (Premack and Woodruff 1978, Baron-Cohen et al. 1985, Stich 
and Nichols 1991, Carruthers and Smith 1996), the general framework has mostly remained 
true to its origins in classical cognitivism and representationalism. This corresponds 
to the currently predominant concepts of emotions: they are not regarded as embodied 
responses to meaningful situations, being perceivable in the bodily expression and conduct 
of another person, but rather as internal cognitive appraisals of environmental stimuli 
(Solomon 1976, Lyons 1980, Nussbaum 2001). Since emotions are thus in principle hidden to 
others, empathy can only be based on mind-reading or on simulating others’ mental states 
inside oneself. 
However, in most everyday situations, we don’t use any introspection, simulation routines or 
inferences when we interact with others. Instead, we immediately perceive their intentions 
and emotions in their expressive behaviour as being related to a meaningful context 
(Gallagher 2008). As I will show in the following, it is mainly bodily resonance which conveys 
an intuitive understanding of others’ emotions in our embodied engagement with them. 
The ongoing interaction induces, on a pre-reflective level, a process of mutual modification 
of bodily and emotional states, thus enabling a primary form of empathy without requiring 
any representations. Accordingly, phenomenological and enactive approaches to sociality 
do not start from isolated individuals and their respective inner states, but from a priority of 
intercorporeality and interaffectivity (Gallagher 2001, Fuchs & De Jaegher 2009, Froese & Fuchs 
2012, De Jaegher 2015).
To elaborate this concept, I will introduce (1) a general concept of embodied affectivity: it 
conceives emotions not as inner mental states residing within individuals (even less their 
brains), but as encompassing spatial phenomena that connect the embodied subject and the 
1  This is a slightly revised version of my chapter „Intercorporeality and Interaffectivity“, in: C. Meyer, J., Streeck, J. S., 




situation with its affective affordances in a circular interaction. (2) This leads to a concept 
of embodied interaffectivity: in every face-to-face encounter, the partners’ subject-bodies 
are intertwined in a process of bodily resonance, coordinated interaction and ‘mutual 
incorporation’ which provides the basis for an intuitive empathic understanding. It can also 
give rise to self-sustaining interaction patterns that go beyond the behavioural dispositions of 
isolated individuals. According to this concept, emotions may not primarily be localized within 
a single individual, but should rather be conceived as phenomena of a shared intercorporeal 
space in which the interacting partners are involved.
(3) Finally, developmental accounts of intersubjectivity point out that sharing and 
understanding each other’s feelings is also based on an intercorporeal memory or implicit 
relational knowledge that is acquired in early childhood. It conveys a basic sense of social 
attunement or a ‘social musicality’. Primary empathy as mediated by embodied interaction 
may subsequently be extended by higher-level cognitive capacities such as perspective-taking 
and imaginary transposition. Nevertheless, intercorporeality and interaffectivity remain the 
basis of social cognition. 
To begin with, we should abandon the idea that emotions are only ‘mental’ phenomena, and 
the world is bare of any affective qualities. The introjection of feelings into an inner ‘psyche’ 
is a heritage of Platonic and, later on, Cartesian dualism. In fact, we do not live in a merely 
physical world; the experienced space around us is always charged with affective qualities. We 
feel, for example, the hilarity of a party, the sadness of a funeral march, the icy climate of a 
conference, the awe-inspiring aura of an old cathedral or the uncanniness of a sombre wood at 
night. Such atmospheric effects are evoked by physiognomic or expressive qualities of objects 
as well as by intermodal features of perception such as rhythm, intensity, dynamics, etc.2
Emotions no less emerge from situations, persons and objects which have their expressive 
qualities, and which attract or repel us. The peculiar intentionality of emotions (see e.g. 
Solomon 1976, Frijda 1994, De Sousa 2010) relates to what is particularly valuable and relevant 
for the subject. In a sense, emotions are ways of perceiving, namely attending to salient 
features of a situation, giving them a significance and weight they would not have without 
the emotion. Referring to Gibson’s (1979) concept of affordances (that means, offerings in the 
environment that are available to animals, such as a tree being ‘climbable’, water ‘drinkable’, 
etc.), one could also speak of affective affordances: things appear to us as ‘interesting’, 
‘expressive’, ‘attractive’, ‘repulsive’, ‘uncanny’, and so on.
How do we experience the affective qualities or affordances of a given situation? Emotions are 
experienced through what I call bodily resonance (Fuchs 2000, 2013a). This includes all kinds of 
local or general bodily sensations: feelings of warmth or coldness, tickling or shivering, pain, 
tension or relaxation, constriction or expansion, sinking, tumbling or lifting, etc. There is no 
emotion without at least the slightest bodily sensations and movement tendencies. Of course, 
when I am moved by an emotion, I may not always be aware of my body; yet being afraid, for 
instance, is not possible without feeling a bodily tension or trembling, a beating of the heart 
or a shortness of breath, and a tendency to withdraw. It is through these sensations that we are 
anxiously directed towards a frightening situation, even if we do not notice them. Therefore, 
bodily feelings and action tendencies should not be conceived as a mere by-product or add-on, 
distinct from the emotion as such, but as the very medium of affective intentionality. The body 
2  These structural qualities of perception have been particularly explored by Gestalt psychology (cf. Koehler 
1992) and nowadays been rediscovered by infant research as so-called „vitality affects“ (Stern 1985). See also the 





is a ‘resonance body’, a most sensitive ‘sounding board’ in which every emotion reverberates 
(James 1884).
This leads to an embodied and extended conception of emotions (Fuchs 2013a):
Emotions emerge as specific forms of a subject’s bodily directedness toward the values and 
affective affordances of a given situation. They encompass subject and situation and therefore 
may not be localized in the interior of persons (be it their psyche or their brain). Rather, 
the affected subject is engaged with an environment that itself has affect-like qualities. 
For example, in shame, an embarrassing situation and the dismissive gazes of others are 
experienced as a painful bodily affection which is the way the subject feels the sudden 
devaluation in others’ eyes. The emotion of shame is extended over the feeling person and his 
body as well as the situation as a whole.
Emotions further imply two components of bodily resonance:
• a centripetal or affective component, i.e. being affected, ‘moved’ or ‘touched’ by an event 
through various forms of bodily sensations (e.g. the blushing and ‘burning’ of shame);
• a centrifugal or ‘emotive’ component, that means, a bodily action readiness, implying specific 
tendencies of movement (e.g. hiding, avoiding the other’s gaze, ‘sinking into the floor’ 
from shame). Other tendencies are approach (desire, anger), avoidance (fear), being-with 
(enjoyment, confidence), rejection (disgust), dominance (pride) or submission (humility, 
resignation) (cf. Frijda 1986). Thus, in emotions “we are moved to move toward or against 
or away” (Sheets-Johnstone 1999: 267).
Taken together, emotions may be regarded as circular interactions or feedback cycles between 
the embodied subject and the situation it is confronted with (cf. fig. 1): Being affected by 
the affective affordances or value features of the situation (‘affection’, impression) triggers a 
specific bodily resonance which in turn influences the emotional perception of the situation 
and implies a corresponding expression and action readiness (‘e-motion’). Embodied affectivity 
consists in the whole interactive cycle which is crucially mediated by the resonance of the 
feeling body. 
Fig. 1: Embodied affectivity 3
3  Adapted from Fuchs 2013a: 623.
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Bodily resonance thus acts as the medium of our affective engagement in a situation. It 
imbues, taints and permeates the perception of this situation without necessarily stepping 
into the foreground. In Polanyi’s terms, bodily resonance is the proximal, and the perceived 
situation is the distal, component of affective intentionality, with the proximal or tacit 
component receding from awareness in favour of the distal (Polanyi 1967). This may be 
compared to the sense of touch which is at the same time a self-feeling of the body (‘proximal’) 
and a feeling of the touched surface (‘distal’); or to the subliminal experience of thirst 
(‘proximal’) which first becomes conspicuous not as such, but as the perceptual salience of 
water flowing nearby (‘distal’). Similarly, bodily resonance initially goes unnoticed; only at a 
certain level of intensity, it becomes conscious as such (for example when one’s hear starts to 
pound in fear). 
If we now turn to the social sphere, we can see that the cycle of ‘affection’ and ‘emotion’, 
impression and expression involves another person as a specific ‘affective affordance’. 
Emotions thus become interactive phenomena which are not only felt from the inside, but also 
displayed and visible in expression and behaviour, often as bodily tokens or rudiments of 
action.4 The facial, gestural and postural expression of a feeling is part of the bodily resonance 
that feeds back into the feeling itself, but also induces processes of interaffectivity: Our body 
is affected by the other’s expression, and we experience the kinetics and intensity of his 
emotions through our own bodily kinaesthesia and sensation. Our body schemas and feelings 
expand and ‘incorporate’ the perceived body of the other. This creates a dynamic interplay 
which forms the basis of social understanding and empathy, and which I will describe as 
mutual incorporation (Schmitz 1989, Leder 1990, Fuchs & De Jaegher 2009). 
Incorporation is a pervasive characteristic of the ‘lived’ or subjective body (Leib) which always 
transcends itself and connects with the environment. This is the case for example in every 
skilful handling of instruments, as when playing piano and letting the fingers find their way 
by themselves; or when a blind man probes his environment with a stick and feels the surface 
at the top of it. In such cases, the instrument is integrated into the body motor schema like 
an extension of the body, subjectively felt as ‘melting’ or being at one with the instrument. 
However, such incorporation also occurs with other people, even at a distance. An example for 
this is fascination. Thus, we may listen to a spellbinder, hanging on his every word, and feel 
being drawn towards him. Or we may watch the performance of an acrobat on a high wire with 
a mixture of fascination and anxiety. Our lived body extends and connects with the acrobat’s 
swinging movements; we may even be prompted to co-movements.
In a more subtle and subliminal way, such coupling occurs in every face-to-face encounter: 
Two cycles of embodied affectivity (fig. 1) become intertwined, thus continuously modifying 
each partner’s affective affordances and bodily resonance, as illustrated in fig. 2:
Let us assume that A is a person whose emotion, e.g. anger, manifests itself in typical bodily 
(facial, gestural, interoceptive, adrenergic, circulatory, etc.) changes. His pre-reflectively 
experienced or lived body thus functions as a felt ‘resonance board’ for his emotion: A feels 
the anger as the tension in his face, as the sharpness of his voice, the arousal in his body etc. 
These proprio- and interoceptive bodily feelings may be termed intra-bodily resonance. Now this 
4  According to Darwin (1872), emotional expressions once served particular action functions (e.g. baring one’s teeth 
in anger to prepare for attack), but now accompany emotions in rudimentary ways in order to communicate these 
emotions to others. Evolutionary psychologists have advanced the hypothesis that hominids have evolved both 
with increasingly differentiated facial expressions and with sophisticated capabilities of understanding these affect 
displays. In any case, though strongly varying between and within cultures, emotional expression is a crucial facet of 





resonance also implies an expression of the emotion, that means, the anger becomes visible and 
is perceived by A’s partner B. Moreover, the expression will also produce an impression, namely 
by triggering corresponding or complementary bodily feelings in B. Thus, A’s sinister gaze, the 
sharpness of his voice or expansive bodily movements might induce in B an unpleasant tension 
or even a jerk, a tendency to withdraw, etc. Thus, B not only sees the anger immediately in A’s 
face and gestures, but also senses it with his own body, through his own intra-bodily resonance. 
Fig. 2: Mutual incorporation and inter-bodily resonance5
However, it does not stay like this, for the impression and bodily reaction caused in B in 
turn becomes an expression for A; it will immediately affect his bodily reaction, change his 
expression, however slightly, and so forth. This creates a circular interplay of expressions and 
reactions running in split seconds and constantly modifying each partner’s bodily state, in 
a process that becomes highly autonomous and is not controlled by the partners. They have 
become parts of a dynamic sensorimotor and inter-affective system that connects both bodies 
by reciprocal movements and reactions, that means, by inter-bodily resonance.6 Of course, the 
signals and reactions involved proceed far too quickly to stand out discretely and become 
conscious as such. Instead, both partners will experience a specific feeling of being bodily 
connected with the other in a way that may be termed mutual incorporation: Each lived body 
with its sensorimotor body schema reaches out, as it were, to be extended by the other. This 
is accompanied by a holistic impression of the interaction partner and his current state (for 
example his anger), and by a feeling for the overall atmosphere of the shared situation (for 
example a tense atmosphere).7
No ‘mental representation’ or ‘mind reading’ is implied in this process. There is no strict or 
dualistic separation between an inside and an outside at all, as if a hidden mental state in A 
5  Adapted from Fuchs 1996.
6  The term ‚resonance‘ is not infrequently used in social neuroscience as underlying social cognition or empathy 
(e.g., ‚motor resonance‘, Gallese 2001, ‚affective resonance‘, Decety & Chaminade 2003, Decety & Meyer 2008), 
but usually related to mirror neuron mechanisms or shared neural representations, without being spelled out 
phenomenologically. This is being done here. For a phenomenological account including references to neural 
resonance mechanisms, see also Gallagher 2012. 
7  As the example shows, this interbodily resonance and resulting atmosphere is by no means restricted to 
‘harmonious’ social situations – interpersonal conflicts may create most intense forms of mutual resonance and 
atmospheric tensions. Even situations of withdrawal, exclusion or ostracizing are felt as an inter-bodily field of 
negative field forces, so-to-speak (cf. Fuchs 2007). 
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produced certain external signs that B would have to decipher.8 For A’s anger may not be 
separated from its bodily resonance and expression; and conversely, B does not perceive 
A’s body as a mere object, but as a living, animate and expressive body that he is in contact 
with. This expressiveness is concentrated and intensified in the gaze: the other is for me not 
somewhere ‘behind his gaze’, but he is visible in it. Even more, I experience the other’s gaze as 
being seen by him, or in other words, I see him seeing me (seeing him). The irrefutable evidence of 
the other’s embodied presence emerges from being mutually affected by each other, or from 
inter-affection.
Nor may the process be described as a bodily simulation of the other’s state that we project 
back onto him. We certainly do not simulate another’s angry gaze or voice, even less his 
anger, in order to notice it, but we rather feel tense, threatened or invaded by his expressive 
bodily behaviour. That means, our resonance is complementary and does not mirror the other’s 
expression. But even in case of corresponding resonance (e.g., the other’s smile inducing a 
smile in me), there is no need for the complicated mechanism of an ‘as-if’-simulation and 
back projection. Instead, my own intra-bodily resonance is simply implied in my perception 
of the other, namely as its ‘proximal’, tacit component. Bodily sensations, tensions, action 
tendencies, etc. that arise in our interaction do not serve as a separate simulation of the other, 
but are part and parcel of our embodied mutual perception.
Using the phenomenological distinction between the subjective, lived body (Leib) and the 
physical, living body (Körper), we can also describe this mutual intertwinement as follows: 
The lived body’s impression in the one person (A) becomes a living body’s visible expression for 
the other person (B), and vice versa: the impression produced in B’s lived body becomes 
a living body’s expression for A. Thus, it is the peculiar ‘chiasmatic’9 structure of the body 
as the turning point of interior and exterior, as both Leib and Körper, which enables the 
interlacement of self and other in the process of mutual affection and perception. This 
analysis may be regarded as an articulation of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘intercorporeality’ 
(intercorporéité, Merleau-Ponty 1960), by which he intended to complement Husserl’s account 
of intersubjectivity as the constitution or ‘appresentation’ of the other by a conscious ego 
(Husserl 1960).10 Intercorporeality means a pre-reflective intertwining of lived and living 
bodies, in which my own is affected by the other’s body as much as his by mine, leading to an 
embodied communication:
The communication or comprehension of gestures comes about through the reciprocity 
of my intentions and the gestures of others, of my gestures and the intentions 
8  Of course, humans are also able to control their emotional expressions, that means, to withhold, to enact or to feign 
emotions to a certain extent, for example when playacting, lying or cheating (such as in poker games), etc. However, 
this does not mean that emotions are actually inner or disembodied states: 
(1) The success of those artificial or feigned expressions depends precisely on the primary interaffectivity: If we 
would not normally perceive others’ expressions as their emotional states, we couldn’t easily be deceived either. 
Spontaneous bodily resonance remains the default mode of non-verbal understanding. 
(2) The control of one’s emotional bodily resonance is restricted to the movement of the voluntary muscles, 
whereas the autonomous bodily resonance and general action readiness remains outside of control. This may 
be demonstrated by measuring muscle tonus, heart rate, skin conductance (think of a lie detector), etc. Hence, 
emotions are still embodied states, even though we may inhibit their motor expression to a certain extent.
9  This term was used by Merleau-Ponty in his later work to denote that our embodied subjectivity may not be located 
merely in either the body’s touching or in its tangibility, in our interior or exterior, but in their intertwining, or where 
the two lines of a chiasm intersect without coinciding (Merleau-Ponty 1968).
10  Certainly Husserl’s concept of intersubjectivity may not be restricted to the Cartesian Meditations in which 
he developed the idea of appresentation. Other accounts, which in part anticipate Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
intercorporeality, are given in Ideen II and Experience and Judgement (Husserl 1952, 1973).
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discernible in the conduct of other people. It is as if the other person’s intentions 
inhabited my body and mine his (Merleau-Ponty 1962).
As we can see, intercorporeality leads to the opposite of a representationalist account: Primary 
social understanding is not an inner modelling in a detached observer, but the other’s body 
extends onto my own, and my own extends onto the other. There is no component within 
the interactive cycle that represents (‘stands for’) another one, for this would require it to 
be separated from the cycle, thus reconstructing inside what is discernible outside. But in 
intercorporeality, inside and outside are not separate domains, but only directions of motion 
within an ongoing mutual transition between expression and impression, or ‘e-motion’ and 
‘affection’.
To illustrate this once more, let us imagine a football play in which one player sees his 
teammate raise his arms rejoicing at a goal. According to representationalism, there are 
objects ‘out there’, in this case a body, whose features are transmitted to the retina, then 
further processed by the brain in order to create an internal representation of the other’s 
body, which is then combined with a theory of mind or simulation mechanism, resulting 
in the appraisal: “he is happy”. Instead of this linear concept, an intercorporeal approach 
emphasizes the circular sensorimotor dynamics within the dyad of embodied agents. Both 
partners are linked to form an encompassing system through mutual perceptions and 
reactions. Grasping, pointing, handing-over, moving-towards, smiling, crying, etc. – all these 
are not just external behaviours that we have to furnish with a meaning by way of inference, 
but through our bodily resonance, they become inherently expressive and meaningful actions. 
Thus, the footballer will immediately perceive the other as an ‘affective affordance’, so to 
speak, and empathically sharing his pleasure, he might also perceive him as a person he could 
hug. His understanding is interactive from the start, and might easily result in spontaneously 
embracing his teammate. No simulation or introspection is necessary to share the pleasure – 
the embrace is merely the manifestation of both player’s intercorporeality and interaffectivity.
The concepts of embodied affectivity and interaffectivity describe universal structures of 
(inter-)subjective experience. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the forms of emotional 
expression and interaction are to a large extent shaped by one’s individual biography as 
well as by one’s cultural background. From early childhood on, patterns of interaction with 
others are sedimented in the infant’s implicit or bodily memory, resulting in what may be 
called intercorporeal memory (Fuchs 2008, 2012). A similar concept is the habitus as a culture- 
or class-specific set of dispositions, skills, styles, tastes and demeanour, which are adopted 
through everyday interactions according to one’s social and cultural background (Bourdieu 
1990). Apart from these acquired dispositions and habits, there is also a history of particular 
interactions between two partners, resulting in what may be called an encompassing or dyadic 
body memory. In this last section, I want to give a short account of these diachronic aspects of 
intercorporeality.
The notion of body memory may be used to denote all forms of implicit memory that are 
mediated by the body and actualised without explicit intention or recollection in our everyday 
conduct (Fuchs 2008, 2012). It thus comprises all those customs, habits, manners, and practices 
which are performed unreflectively or ‘as a matter of course’. It is a procedural memory for 
motion patterns such as walking or dancing, for handling instruments such as a bicycle or 
a keyboard, for familiar gestalts of perception, for complex spatial situations (for example 
finding one’s bearings in a dwelling or a town), and last not least for the habitual bodily 








situations and enables skilled interactions with the social environment. Whereas explicit 
recollection is directed to the past, implicit or body memory re-enacts the past through the 
body’s present performance; in other words, it may be regarded as our ‘lived past’. 
Implicit or body memory does not mean a subpersonal motion program realised by a body 
machine without a subject. When I am dancing, the rhythmic movements originate from my 
body without a need to steer them deliberately – and yet I am living in my movements, I sense 
them in advance, and I can modulate them according to the rhythm that I feel: I myself am 
dancing, and not a ghost in a body machine. The movements of my body are at my disposal, I 
am aware of my capacities, and thus I feel up to my present task as an embodied being. In the 
last analysis, all capacities acquired in life are integrated into a primordial capability of the 
embodied subject, a basic sense of agency or ‘I can’ (Husserl 1952: 253). 
More specifically, intercorporeal memory means a pre-reflective, practical knowledge of how to 
interact with others in face-to-face encounters which is acquired already in early childhood. 
This is enabled by implicit or procedural learning which the infant is capable of from birth on, 
whereas explicit and autobiographical memory only develop in the course of further brain 
maturation, i.e. from the 2nd year of life on (Welzer & Markowitsch 2005, Bauer 2006). Let us 
look at these early learning processes in more detail: 
Infants are attuned from birth to social interactions, in particular by showing a heightened 
attention to faces and their expressions (Valenza et al. 1996; Turati et al. 2002). Research 
studies conducted during the last two decades have mostly found that they are also able to 
imitate adults’ gestures like sticking out their tongue, opening their mouth, frowning and 
others (Meltzoff and Moore 1977, 1989). Thus it seems that the newborn’s body schema 
is characterized by an intermodal openness that immediately allows it to transpose the 
perceived expressions into its own proprioception and movement.11 Since bodily imitation 
evokes corresponding feelings as well, we may assume that a mutual bodily resonance also 
emerges in the early dyadic interactions. This assumption is supported by the fact that 6-8 
weeks olds already engage in proto-conversation with their mothers by smiling and vocalizing 
(Trevarthen 1979, 1993). They both exhibit a finely tuned coordination of movements, 
rhythmic synchrony and mirroring of expressions, that has often been compared to a couple 
dance (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997: 131). Infant and caregiver also follow a turn-taking pattern, 
shifting the roles of agent and recipient in a non-random sequence (Jasnow and Feldstein 
1986).12 
As early as in the first months, infants become capable of discerning emotions such as 
happiness, sadness, and surprise in the postures, movements, facial expressions, gestures, 
and vocalizations of others (Hobson 2005: 39ff.). The basis for this is that different sense 
modalities can have the same ‘kinematics’ and thus express the same affect. Infants both 
perceive and express affects as the intermodal extract of rhythmic, melodic, vocal, facial and 
gestural characteristics: ‘crescendo’ or ‘decrescendo’, ‘accelerando’ or ‘ritardando’, rising or falling 
movements, flowing or explosive dynamics, etc. Thus, for example, the feeling of joy and the 
11  Recent research with larger samples and a wider range of gestures presented to the infants challenges these 
results, finding no significant excess of matching over non-matching reactions (Oostenbroek et al. 2016). But even 
if it turns out that imitation is not an innate capacity, but learnt in the course of mutual exchanges during the first 
months, it still functions as a major component of what Trevarthen (1979) has termed “primary intersubjectivity”.
12  It should be noted, however, that early communication does not ideally mean “complete synchronisation”, 
but always includes sequences of matches, mismatches and subsequent “repair” which are also important for the 
infant to experience a difference between the mother as different from him- or herself, as shown my micro-analyses 
of the interaction (Tronick and Cohn 1989, Beebe et al. 1997). Synchronisation thus means a rhythmic or phasic 
harmonisation, not complete congruence.
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various expressions of joy have similar intermodal dynamics, and this is the basis for the direct 
perception of others’ emotional states even in earliest childhood. 
According to Stern (1985), the temporal flow patterns and kinematics of the interaction that 
are felt by both partners result in affective attunement, which may be regarded as equivalent to 
inter-bodily resonance and mutual incorporation. This means that emotions are not primarily 
observed in others, but they emerge as dyadic affective states, often as an intense pleasure or joy 
(Tronick 1998). The shared affect during a joyful playing situation between mother and infant 
may not be divided and distributed among them. It arises from the ‘between’, or from the 
situation in which both are immersed. Thus, affects are not enclosed in an inner mental sphere 
to be deciphered from outside, but emerge, change and circulate between self and other in the 
intercorporeal dialogue.
The recursive patterns of these interactions are now sedimented in the infant’s body memory, 
leading to what Lyons-Ruth and Stern (1998) have called implicit relational knowing. This means 
a pre-reflective knowledge or skill of how to deal with others – how to share pleasure, elicit 
attention, express happiness, avoid rejection, re-establish contact etc. The infant acquires 
specific interactive schemes („schemes of being-with“, Stern 1985) and body micro-practices 
that are needed for a growing range of interactions. Implicit relational knowing is a temporally 
organised, ‘musical’ memory for the rhythm and dynamics that are subliminally present in the 
interaction with others (Stern 1985, Amini et al. 1996). It also implies an interaffective memory 
for the specific ‘feel’ of the shared vitality contours and the emotions that they carry. 
Already in the first few months of life, infants demonstrate a memory for shared interaction 
sequences through the way they expect their mothers to react. Babies quickly learn to which 
emotional expressions parents respond, are spurned to action, or rather dismiss, etc. An 
impressive demonstration of the emergence of intercorporeal memory is enabled by the ‘still 
face’ experiment (Weinberg & Tronick 1996): during play with her infant, the mother is asked 
to assume a blank facial expression and stare straight ahead for two minutes. Babies from 2-3 
months on usually react with clear irritation and unease – the expected resonance from the 
mother is absent – and they try in every possible way, with gestures and vocalizing, to elicit 
the mother’s attention and to re-establish the familiar form of contact. More specifically, two 
groups of children can be differentiated (Field 1984):
1) Infants of sensitive and lively mothers remain active even in the still-face situation, and 
obviously expect to bring their mother back into contact in this way.
2) Infants of mothers who are more detached and lacking resonance (for instance, because of 
post-partum depression), react differently; in the beginning they are restless, but quickly 
become passive and helpless. In other words, they have not learned to effectively use 
their behaviour to induce contact. Later on these children show a marked weakness in 
attachment (Field et al. 1988). 
These considerations and research results may suffice to show that intercorporeality is shaped 
by individual experiences which to a large extent date back to early childhood interactions, 
but have a lasting and even lifelong influence on our embodied relationships with others.
From a sociological point of view, body memory, and in particular intercorporeal memory, 
may also be seen as the carrier of the habitus, that means, a set of dispositions, skills, styles, 
tastes and behaviour that is shared by the members of a community, class or culture. The 
habitus is acquired by the individual through practical immersion in the life world, in the 
course of interactive experiences, mimetic learning, implicit routines, rituals etc. As Bourdieu 
notes (1977: 94), societies treat “… the body as memory; they entrust to it in abbreviated and 
practical, i.e. mnemonic, form the fundamental principles of the arbitrary concepts of culture. 
The principles embodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness.” This 




embodied memory is realised by an “implicit pedagogy” (l.c.); it does not require purposeful 
instructions, deliberate imitation or other kinds of explicit learning. On the contrary, the 
habitus becomes a second nature which effectively guides one’s behaviour, all the more as it is 
not conscious as a habitus.
This is also important for our concepts of social understanding: The homogeneity of the 
habitus as the shared body memory of a community or culture entails that the embodied 
practices are immediately evident or foreseeable on the background of a given situation. This 
provides a primary, non-inferential understanding of others without requiring conscious 
transposition, perspective-taking or simulation (“what would I do in his place?”). Growing up 
and being immersed in a common practical context results in tacit knowledge of the “rules of 
the game” and of typical interactive sequences (Condon 1979). Like the players of a football 
team on the field, the members of a culture normally understand each other intuitively, 
anticipate the next moves and know how to react, without a need to resort to deliberation, to a 
theory of mind or mentalising procedures. 
The habitus thus becomes the basis of common sense or sensus communis, namely as a practical 
sense of embodied social customs and interactions which constitutes the pre-reflective 
background of social life. In this way, collective styles of intercorporeality and interaction are 
passed on from one generation to the next without becoming explicit – in an unconscious, 
collective history. Thus Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intercorporeality gains an additional aspect: 
It means not only the primary familiarity of our bodies with each other, or their pre-reflective 
communication, but also the entanglement of human bodies in a shared history that is 
preserved in their implicit collective memory. 
When relating the phenomenological concept of body memory to Bourdieu’s habitus, however, 
one precaution seems necessary. Bourdieu himself has repeatedly criticised phenomenological 
approaches as relying merely on subjective descriptions, thus failing to account for the 
sociological determination of commonsensical practices (cf. Bourdieu 1977: 3f., 183; 2000: 132). 
While this may be disputed in particular in the light of Husserl’s later work on the habitus 
(see e.g. Husserl 1973: 122) and of Schütz’ social phenomenology of the life world (Schütz 
1962), there is a reverse tendency in Bourdieu to adopt an objectivist and structuralist point 
of view which results in an overly deterministic picture of human sociality. One of the main 
reasons for this is that he mistakenly regards all non-representational forms of knowledge and 
habit (‘knowing how’) as necessarily ‘non-conscious’ and as such not accessible to conscious 
modification or control. However, as I have pointed out above, the realisation of bodily skills 
and practices is not a subpersonal process but open to modifications or even explicit changes 
by the subject. In principle, persons are always capable of acquiring new social skills; they may 
even reflect on their incorporated social background and then deliberately strive to transform 
their own habitus – though this may take a great deal of time and effort. Thus, the concept of 
body memory does not involve a deterministic stance but is open to individual creativity and 
social change. 
As we have seen, each body forms an extract of its past history of experiences with others 
that are laid out in its intercorporeal memory. As a result of learning processes, which 
are in principle comparable to the acquiring of motor skills, social agents shape and enact 
their relationships according to the patterns they have extracted from earlier and earliest 
experience. On the other hand, each particular interaction, when repeated, also acquires its 
own history, thus pre-figuring and constraining future interactions between the respective 
partners. One may, for example, develop a specific style of interacting with a close friend 
which is only possible with this person and re-emerges immediately even after years of 
separation. Then the intercorporeal memories of both partners unite to form a joint procedural 




field that suggests and preordains typical interactions and shared experiences. It may also 
be regarded as a space of two body schemas which are attuned to each other through 
sensorimotor patterns generated by the shared history: rituals of welcoming, repertoires 
of gestures, postures, movements, voice pitch and even dialects which one ‘falls into’ in the 
presence of the other. Hence, we may say that there is, in a certain sense, a memory of the 
interactive process itself, or a joint or dyadic body memory.
Let us take another example, namely a well-trained couple of dancers who move easily with 
the rhythm of the music, make the suitable turns even on the slightest signals of the other, 
and whose hands and bodies find each other without guidance of the gaze. Both partners apply 
their procedural and intercorporeal skills, and yet they move and feel in a way that is only 
possible within the interaction. Together they create the spatio-temporal pattern of the dance 
which in turn draws them into its superordinate dynamics, implying the mutual incorporation 
already described above. Their kinaesthetic body schemes literally extend and connect with 
each other to form an overarching dynamic process. Rhythm and melody particularly support 
this incorporation by providing dynamic constraints for the movements of both partners. Each 
of them behaves and experiences differently from how they would do outside of the process 
(or with another partner); their interaction has gained an autonomy of its own (De Jaegher & 
Di Paolo 2007). 
Where shall we localize this memory of joint dancing and other skilful bodily interactions? On 
the one hand, the superordinate or dyadic bodily system certainly has no natural substrate for 
forming a memory – it only consists of the present connection of two lived bodies in which 
the respective dispositions have formed. A ‘memory of the system’ must finally be based on 
the individual and biological memories of the agents involved in order to become effective 
for behaviour. On the other hand, it is only together that the individuals are in a position to 
re-enact the dyadic pattern, which justifies to attribute this memory or knowing-how in a 
sense to the dyad itself. It is a memory not in the sense of ‘I can’ but of ‘we can’. As we can see, 
intercorporeality means more than inter-bodily resonance and mutual incorporation: it may 
also be regarded as an overarching system which over time gains its own pattern, autonomous 
dynamics and peculiar history. 
I have outlined a concept of primary or pre-reflective intersubjectivity which is based on 
embodied affectivity and interaffectivity. It conceives emotions not as inner mental states that 
have to be deciphered or inferred from external cues, but as expressive, dynamic forces which 
affect individuals through bodily resonance and connect them with one another in circular 
interactions. In face-to-face encounters, each partner’s lived body reaches towards the other 
to form an overarching system through inter-bodily resonance and mutual incorporation. 
According to this concept, social understanding is primarily based on intercorporeality; it 
emerges from the interactive practice and coordination of embodied agents. We do not need 
to form internal models or representations of others in order to understand and communicate 
with them; as bodily subjects, we are always already involved in a shared affective and 
expressive space. 
In social contacts, our lived bodies become extended such that they are intertwined with those 
of others in a way that prevents any conceptual or ontological reduction to isolated entities. 
This applies both to current interactions and to the history of interactive patterns. From early 
childhood on, social understanding and empathy develop as a practical sense, a musicality 
for the rhythms, dynamics and patterns of interactions with others. Intermodal kinematics 
and bodily resonance are key to attuning and sharing each other’s affects within the primary 
dyad. Thus, in a non-mentalising way, infants are already able to perceive the emotions and 




to the context of the common situation. This provides a primary understanding without 
recourse to a concept of mental states. 
Moreover, developmental research indicates that empathy is based on an intercorporeal 
memory or an implicit relational knowledge of how to interact with others that is acquired 
in early childhood and conveys a basic sense of social attunement. In each social encounter, 
both partners unconsciously re-enact a history of embodied socialization and relationships 
that have shaped their styles of interacting, their empathic skills and intuitions as well as 
their class- and culture-specific habitus. Finally, embodied intersubjectivity can also give rise 
to self-sustaining interaction patterns that go beyond the behavioral dispositions of isolated 
individuals. They may be attributed to a memory of the intercorporeal system and its partially 
autonomous dynamics, an ‘attractor landscape’, so-to-speak, that is actualised and modified in 
every new encounter of the participating agents. 
To be sure, this embodied and enactive concept does not exhaust the possibilities of empathic 
understanding and intersubjectivity. On the basis of primary bodily empathy, we are also 
able to explicitly represent, to imagine or to question the other’s situation. This happens in 
particular when their behaviour seems ambiguous, or when an irritation or misunderstanding 
occurs. Through additional information and inference, we can then try to enhance our 
understanding, infer possible hidden intentions and in this way often deepen our empathy. 
A further possibility is to transpose oneself into the other’s situation and imagine how 
one would feel or react in his place. Here we use a kind of simulation which I prefer to call 
‘imaginary transposition’ or ‘perspective taking’ (Fuchs 2013b).
Such higher-level forms of social understanding develop later in life, mainly from the 2nd 
to 4th year. Knowledge about others that is based on language and narrative reports plays a 
crucial role for these later stages of intersubjectivity (Gallagher & Hutto 2008, Hutto 2009). 
However, “… it is only gradually and with considerable input from adults that children 
eventually come to conceive of something like ‘bodies’ on the one hand and ‘minds’ on the 
other” (Hobson 1993: 117). Even then one may argue that the concept of ‘Theory of Mind’ was 
misleading from the start, since the very term presupposes a kind of inferential and scientific 
approach to others’ allegedly hidden minds as the standard mode of intersubjectivity. Yet 
the need for such an approach arises mainly in situations in which intercorporeal and verbal 
communication becomes ambiguous or extremely restricted, such as poker games or the Cuba 
crisis. Sophisticated, detective-like cognitive capacities are neither necessary nor sufficient 
to enable empathic intersubjective relations. Despite those later developments, our everyday 
social understanding remains based on embodied intersubjectivity.
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